

# US Administration Policy

## PRE-NULLIFICATION POLICY

### ICC and September 11th



[Address of Pierre-Richard Prosper at Peace Palace, The Hague Dec. 19, 2001](#) on US policy re: accountability for war crimes

### The International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR)



[Statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes before the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives, Feb. 28, 2002](#), "The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of Justice?"



[Transcript of Remarks by U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper, March 28, 2002](#)

### The Crime of Aggression



[US delegate to the 8th ICC Preparatory Commission Session](#), "Crime of Aggression: Statement by the United States, Sept. 26, 2001

## POST-NULLIFICATION POLICY, GENERALLY

Subsequent to the May 6th ICC policy announcement by the administration that it was nullifying the US signature on the Statute, the administration has said that:

- It will continue to have a leadership role in promoting international justice, but will devote its resources to supporting domestic or combined domestic/international tribunals such as the Special Court in Sierra Leone, and as a last resort, to the creation of ad hoc courts by the Security Council.
- It plans to amend federal law to expand US ability to initiate domestic prosecutions.
- It plans to actively negotiate bilateral non-surrender (so-called Article 98[2]) agreements "with every country in the world, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified the ICC, regardless of whether they intend to in the future."
- It "will regard as illegitimate any attempt by the court or state parties to the treaty to assert the ICC's jurisdiction over American citizens" and "will taken the actions necessary to ensure that [its] efforts to meet [its] global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which [it does] not accept."
- It will "respect the right of other states to be part of the ICC" but "they in turn must respect [its] decision not to be bound by jurisdictional claims to which [it] has not consented."
- Amb. Pierre Prosper has said that the US has not ruled out the possibility that it will allow the Security Council to refer cases to the Court when it is in the US interest, but he has also said that that "the ICC should not expect any support or cooperation from the United States government."



[John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security "The United States and the International Criminal Court," remarks to the Federalist Society, Washington, D.C., November 14, 2002](#) (NOTE: This speech is similar to one delivered to the Aspen Institute in Berlin, Germany on September 16, 2002 [see below].)



[AMICC factsheet: Chronology of US Opposition to the International Criminal Court: From 'Unsigning' to Immunity Agreements, November 5, 2002](#)

-  [Statement by Nicholas Rostow, General Counsel, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, at the Fifty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee](#), on the International Criminal Court, October 14, 2002
-  [Excerpt from the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America \(p. 31\), released September 2002](#)
-  [John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security "The United States and the International Criminal Court," remarks at the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany, September 16, 2002](#)
-  ["US Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court," Jennifer Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, September 3, 2002](#)
-  [Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper Remarks to the Simon Bond International Wannsee Seminar](#), Berlin, July 9, 2002
-  [US Department of State Fact Sheet: "The International Criminal Court," Office of War Crimes Issues, May 6, 2002](#)

## PEACEKEEPING AND THE ICC

### Background

On June 30, 2002, on a vote of 13 in favor and one against, the US stood alone in vetoing the Security Council resolution extending the mandate of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), a critical part of the international community's multi-billion dollar commitment to ensure long-term peace in the region. Bush Administration officials said that the US would not approve an extension of the Bosnian, or any other, mission unless international peacekeepers on the ground were given a permanent blanket immunity from arrest and prosecution by the ICC.

Subsequently, UNMIBH was given several brief extensions due to the temporary inability of the Security Council to find a compromise solution. On July 3, the PrepCom held a special plenary during which many states made statements in opposition to the US position. On July 10, there was an open Security Council meeting during which many additional states made statements against US attempts leverage peacekeeping operations as a weapon for Security Council action against the ICC. Finally, on July 12, 2002, members of the Security Council achieved compromise language and adopted an [omnibus peacekeeping resolution](#) by consensus, which allowed the UNMIBH mission to continue uninterrupted.

The text of UNSC Resolution 1422 attempts to track the requirements of [Article 16](#) of the ICC Statute, which authorizes the Security Council to act under its Chapter VII authority to suspend any ICC proceeding on a case-by-case basis for renewable 12-month periods. However, while that article merely authorizes the SC to stop an active investigation or prosecution against a specific individual, 1422 attempts to prospectively prevent the ICC from taking up any case against an entire class of persons.

Some commentators have even questioned whether such Security Council action is an *ultra vires* attempt to *de facto* amend the Rome Statute by creating prospective immunity for an entire class of persons — all peacekeepers from non-state parties serving anywhere — solely based on their status. This argument emphasizes that in addition to risking undermining the delicate balance of power between the Court and the Council carefully negotiated in Article 16, the resolution arguably contravenes Article 27 of the ICC Statute, which makes official capacity irrelevant in the determination of criminal responsibility under the Statute.

Moreover, at the time 1422 was adopted, member states such as Canada, Brazil, New Zealand and South Africa stated that they believe that a resolution of this character violates the U.N. Charter itself, as action under Chapter VII requires, at a minimum, the existence of a specific threat to international peace and security. For example, at an open session of the Council to debate the issue, Prince Zeid Al-Hussein, Jordan's Permanent Representative to the UN, asked, "How could the Security Council adopt a Chapter VII resolution on the Court, when the latter cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be considered a threat to international peace and security?"

On the other hand, some supporters of the US position argue that the fact that the negotiators of the ICC Statute did not envisage the application of Article 16 in precisely the manner that unfolded in UNSC Resolution 1422 does not necessarily invalidate the procedure that was adopted. They assert that far from being a *de facto* amendment of the ICC Statute, UNSC Resolution 1422 implements the Statute in a manner that achieved the consensus of the U.N. Security Council.

Some ICC member states may seek to ensure that UN Security Council Resolution 1422 is not renewed on July 1, 2003. Among steps that could be taken, these member states may:

- have the Assembly of States Parties issue an understanding on the meaning of Article 16 that would allow the ICC to investigate any accused peacekeeper until the Security Council issued a resolution on that specific case;
- work through the General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to issue an advisory opinion on whether the Council exceeded its powers in adopting UN SC Resolution 1422;
- as individual states with custody of an accused peacekeeper, refuse to accept the legality of UNSC Resolution 1422;

Read more detail on US efforts in an [CICC Fact sheet: Chronology of US Anti-ICC Draft Proposals Leading to the Adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422](#).

US administration concerns about the difficulty of renewing UNSC Resolution 1422 in 2003 have propelled US efforts to conclude bilateral immunity agreements to prevent the extradition of US nationals to the Court. [Read more](#).

In related developments, on December 4th 2002 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to send more peacekeepers to the Congo after a delayed vote caused by US demands for language keeping US peacekeepers from the ICC. There are currently no US peacekeeping soldiers serving in the Congo, and Washington dropped the effort after other Council members refused to go along. [Read more](#).

### **2003 Renewal**

On June 12th, 2003, the Security Council renewed resolution 1422 for one more year. The text of adopted [resolution 1487](#) is identical to 1422. Before the vote, the Secretary General and representatives of close to 60 countries spoke out against the resolution and against renewal. Many states argued that the resolution is unnecessary, inappropriate and illegal under the Rome Statute, the UN Charter, and general international law. Most explicitly rejected any attempt to automatically renew this resolution in the future. After the vote, eight Security Council members, plus the three that abstained in the vote (Germany, France, and Syria) expressed their support for the ICC and confidence in its work. Pakistan joined the US in expressing reservations about the Court.

Read [country statements](#), the [Secretary General's remarks](#), and the [United States' comments](#).

### **Text of Final Resolution and Drafts**



[Security Council Resolution 1487 on peacekeeping, adopted June 12, 2003](#)



[Security Council Resolution 1422 on peacekeeping, adopted July 12, 2002](#)



[US draft Security Council Resolution July 10, 2002 \(not adopted\)](#)



[US draft Security Council Resolution June 19, 2002 \(not adopted\)](#)

### **International Reaction**

[Click here to read about the international reaction to US efforts to exempt peacekeepers from non-state parties from the ICC.](#)




### **Official US Statements**



[Statement by Ambassador James Cunningham, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations, on the Renewal of Resolution 1422, June 12, 2003](#)



-  [Statement by H.E. John D. Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks following UN Security Council vote on Resolution 1422](#), including discussion of US pursuance of bilateral immunity agreements, July 12, 2002
-  [Statement by H.E. Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the USA to the UN, at the UN Security Council open debate](#) on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 10, 2002
-  [Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper Remarks to the Simon Bond International Wannsee Seminar](#), Berlin, July 9, 2002
-  [Department of Defense Briefing, Background Briefing on the Possible Effects of the International Criminal Court on U.S. Military Personnel, July 2, 2002](#)
-  [Explanation of vote by H.E. Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the UN](#), on the renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Security Council, June 30, 2002
-  [Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Briefing on the Global War on Terrorism](#) (discussion of ICC and peacekeeping), June 21, 2002
-  [Remarks by Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, United States Alternate Representative to the United Nations](#), on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the Security Council Stake-Out, June 19, 2002

### Legal and Policy Analysis

- [Amnesty International, The Unlawful Attempt by the Security Council to Give US Citizens Permanent Impunity from International Justice, May 1, 2003](#)
-  [Human Rights Watch, Closing the Door to Impunity: HRW Recommendations for Renewing Resolution 1422, April 22, 2003](#)
-  [Collection of Legal Scholars Opinions on the Legal and Policy Implications of Resolution 1422](#), compiled by Parliamentarians for Global Action, April 2003
-  [Kai Ambos, International Criminal Law Has Lost Its Innocence GLJ Vol. 3 No. 10 - 01 October 2002 - European & International Law](#)
- [ASIL Insight: Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers from International Criminal Court Proceedings, by Bryan MacPherson \(July 2002\)](#)

[Read media reports on reaction to US efforts in the Security Council.](#)

### Texts of UN Agreements

-  [Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations](#), UN Doc. A/46/185, May 23, 1991
-  [Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations](#), UN Doc. A/45/594, Oct. 9, 1990
- [Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations](#), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 February 1946, entered into force on 17 September 1946.

## BILATERAL IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS

### US Campaign

The Bush Administration has begun a vigorous campaign of trying to conclude bilateral international agreements that will remove US nationals from the reach of the Court. The administration claims that these agreements meet the requirements of Article 98(2) of the ICC Statute. That article reads:

"The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending

State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender."

The United States is pressing on countries a [draft text](#) that would prevent them from delivering any of a broad group of persons—including both US and non-US nationals—to the ICC. "Persons" are defined in the agreement as,

"[C]urrent or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party."

The US says that this agreement is authorized by 98(2). In fact, 98(2) only addresses treaties between countries covering persons that they have sent to each other on official business. The Article's wording explicitly requires the existence of a "sending state" relationship, such as when US military and civilian personnel are sent to a receiving state by the US government pursuant to Status of Forces or Status of Mission agreements (SOFAs or SOMAs). Such treaties often say that if such a person commits a crime in a country where he or she has been sent, he or she is to be returned to the sending country.

While many people have the impression that Article 98(2) was drafted by the US to create a loophole from the jurisdiction of the ICC, it actually grew out of the concerns of many states that their existing obligations under surrender agreements, especially SOFAs and SOMAs could conflict with their obligation to cooperate with the ICC. Therefore, parallel to Article 98(1), which addresses conflicts between the Statute and diplomatic immunity, Article 98(2) was developed to resolve potential conflicts in other kinds of situations where individuals have entered a state's territory on official US business, whether pursuant to a SOFA, SOMA, or perhaps even an extradition agreement.

The agreement the United States wants is not about the conduct of official business. It applies to any of a wide variety of persons who may be on the territory of either party for any purpose at any time. The Rome Statute does therefore not authorize this agreement and countries adhering to it will violate their obligations to the Court under the Statute.

Although the US has said that it is not applying pressure on states to sign non-surrender agreements, some US government officials have indicated that a state's unwillingness to sign could affect US support for its entry into NATO and lead to the cut off of US military aid. While some officials have argued that the administration is obligated by the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) to withhold military aid from states parties that do not conclude such agreements, administration Spokesperson Reeker has acknowledged that the ASPA "does not prevent the United States from providing military assistance to any country when the president determines that such assistance is important to the national interests." There have been reports in the media and by foreign officials and NGOs that threats have been made toward smaller countries to cut off non-military aid as well.

### Recent Developments

- In May 2003, it was reported that Barbara Bodine of the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will be in charge of BIA negotiations. Department envoy Marisa Lino had been leading the effort since Fall 2002.
- In response to the **European Union** common policy opposing bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) and continued difficulties faced by the US in convincing countries to sign on, in June 2003 "[t]he Bush administration charged the European Union with actively undermining US efforts to shield Americans from prosecution by the International Criminal Court and warned that the impact on transatlantic relations will be "very damaging" if the EU does not stop." See [Colum Lynch, Wash. Post](#).
- **Bosnia** is one of the latest to sign a BIA after succumbing to US threats to withhold the release of \$73 million worth of assistance. Read more.
- **Croatia** is standing firm against signing a BIA despite US threats to cut off \$19 million in aid. Read a statement by the US Ambassador to Croatia.
- **Caribbean Community (CARICOM)** countries are maintaining their strong refusal to sign BIA agreements despite US threats to end assistance to the New Horizon's program, which includes hurricane disaster relief, and dental and veterinarian programs. Read more about the CARICOM position
- The **African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States, Canada, Mexico and Colombia** are also refusing to give in to U.S. demands.

### Countries Concluding Bilateral Agreements<sup>^</sup>

**Afghanistan** (SP) 9/20/02

**Gabon** (SP) 5/2/03

**Nepal** (N) 12/31/02

<b>Albania</b> (SP) 5/2/03	<b>Gambia</b> (SP) 10/5/02	<b>Palau</b> (N) 9/13/02
<b>Azerbaijan</b> (N) 2/26/03	<b>Georgia</b> (S) 2/10/03	<b>Philippines</b> (S) 5/?/03
<b>Bahrain</b> (S) 2/6/03	<b>Ghana</b> (SP) 5/2/03	<b>Romania*</b> <b>#</b> (SP) 8/1/02
<b>Bhutan</b> (N) 5/2/03	<b>Honduras</b> (SP) 9/19/02	<b>Rwanda</b> (N) 3/4/03
<b>Bolivia</b> (SP) 5/?/03	<b>India</b> (N) 12/26/02	<b>Sierra Leone</b> (SP) 3/31/03
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> (SP) 5/16/03	<b>Israel*</b> ( <b>S</b> ) 8/4/02	<b>Sri Lanka</b> (N) 11/22/02
<b>Djibouti</b> (SP) 1/24/03	<b>Madagascar</b> (S) 5/2/03	<b>Tajikistan</b> (SP) <b>@</b> 8/27/02
<b>Dominican Republic</b> (SP) 9/13/02	<b>Maldives</b> (N) 5/2/03	<b>Thailand</b> (S) 6/?/03
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b> (SP) 4/2/03	<b>Marshall Islands</b> (SP) 9/10/02	<b>Tonga</b> (N) 4/2/03
<b>East Timor*</b> (SP) 8/23/02	<b>Mauritania</b> (N) 9/17/02	<b>Tuvalu</b> (N) 1/30/03
<b>Egypt</b> (S) 5/?/03	<b>Micronesia</b> (N) 9/24/02	<b>Uganda</b> (SP) 6/11/03
<b>El Salvador</b> (N) 10/25/02	<b>Nauru</b> (SP) 2/26/03	<b>Uzbekistan</b> (S) 9/18/02

**S = signatory / SP = State Party / N = neither**

\* States indicating that these agreements must be approved at the parliamentary level before they become binding; other countries may also require parliamentary approval.

# These agreements are not reciprocal; other countries may also have signed non-reciprocal agreements.

@ The reciprocal agreement with Tajikistan provides immunity from prosecution by the ICC for 1 year.

^ It was reported by the State Department on 6/12/03 that some agreements are being kept secret at the request of the party state.

Governments publicly indicating that they are unlikely to sign such an agreement include Argentina, Austria, Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia. It is also noteworthy that [Secretary of State Powell announced an increase in military assistance to Columbia](#) despite his inability to persuade President Uribe to exempt Americans serving in Colombia from the ICC. [Read more.](#)

#### Texts of Bilateral Agreements



[Text of agreement between the US and East Timor](#) (signed August 23, 2002)



[Text of agreement between the US and Nepal](#) (signed December 31, 2002)



[Text of agreement between the US and Romania](#) (signed August 1, 2002)



[Text of agreement between the US and Uzbekistan](#) (signed September 18, 2002, entered into force January 7, 2003)



[Proposed text of bilateral immunity agreement with the United States](#) (July 2002)

#### International Reaction

[Click here to read about the international reaction to US efforts to conclude bilateral immunity agreements.](#)

## Official US Statements

-  [Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2003](#), reacting to question about approach of July 1 ASPA funding cut-off deadline
-  [Excerpt from Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Bogotá, Colombia, December 4, 2002](#), explaining Colombia's rejection of the US-proposed bilateral immunity agreement.
-  [News Briefing by Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, October 10, 2002](#), explaining US dissatisfaction with EU guidelines for Article 98(2) agreements.
-  [Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, October 1, 2002](#), reacting to announcement of EU guidelines for Article 98(2) agreements.
-  [President Bush on bilateral immunity agreements, September 30, 2002](#), remarks prior to discussions with president Alvaro Uribe of Colombia and an exchange with reporters
-  [Press briefing with Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at Large for War Crimes Issues, on progress with bilateral immunity agreements \(London, UK\), September 24, 2002](#)
-  [Federal News Service, State Department Regular Briefing with Philip Reeker, Deputy Department Spokesman, August 12-13, 2002](#)
-  [U.S. and Romania Sign Article 98 Agreement, Press Statement, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, August 1, 2002](#)
-  [Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, July 25, 2002](#), discussing ongoing US negotiation of bilateral immunity agreements
-  [Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Defense Department Operational Update Briefing June 26, 2002](#), discussing US desire to use the Security Council to obtain exemptions for its servicemembers, US pursuit of bilateral immunity agreements, and implying that the Court may somehow be used by terrorists against the US

## Legal and Policy Analysis

### [CICC documents](#)

-  [Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme \(FIDH\), No to American Exceptionalism — Under Cover of the War Against Terrorism, a Destructive US Offensive Against the ICC, December 2002](#), an authoritative view of the campaign from the European perspective.
-  [Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The need for the European Union to take more effective steps to prevent members from signing US impunity agreements, October 10, 2002](#)
-  [Coalition for the International Criminal Court \(CICC\) Secretariat, Bilateral agreements proposed by US government \(a legal analysis\), August 23, 2002](#)
-  [Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: US efforts to obtain impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, August 2002](#)
-  [HRW, "United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court": Article 98 Agreements, August 2, 2002](#)
-  [HRW, "United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court": Article 98\(2\) Agreements, July 9, 2002](#)

## WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN IRAQ

### Government Information

[US Department of State website, War Crimes in Iraq](#)

[Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing: "Prosecuting Iraqi War Crimes; A Consideration of the Different Forum Options," April 10, 2003](#)



[Senate Resolution HR 101 \(108th Cong.\)](#), April 10, 2003, calling for the prosecution of Iraqis and their supporters for war crimes, and for other purposes.

[U.S. Army Identified 500 Alleged Iraqi War Criminals in 1992, Report Released under FOIA is a Precursor to 2003 War Crimes Proceedings](#), The National Security Archive at George Washington University, March 20, 2003



[House of Representatives Resolution HR 118 \(108th Cong.\)](#), February 27, 2003, calling for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.



[UK Parliament Debate](#), February 25, 2003, discussing how exile for Saddam Hussein would be impacted by the existence of the ICC



[Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Department of State Daily Press Briefing](#), January 17, 2003, discussing the possibility of trials for top Iraqi officials



[Ari Fleischer, White House Spokesperson, Press Briefing, October 11, 2002](#), re US plans for addressing war crimes in Iraq



[Saddam Hussein As a War Criminal](#), remarks by Ambassador Scheffer, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes in the Clinton Administration to Congressional Human Rights Caucus, entered into the Congressional Record September 22, 2000

For more remarks by David Scheffer, President Clinton's Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, in reference to war crimes in Iraq, [click here](#).

#### Press Coverage

[US Intelligence Categorizes Iraqis to Punish, or to Deal With](#), by Thom Shanker and David Johnston, New York Times, February 25, 2003



["Wartime Justice: Legal Experts Ponder a Trial for Saddam Hussein"](#), James Podgers, ABA Journal eReport, February 21, 2003



[Q&A with Phil Shiner, Michael Scharf, Jim Clancy, and Zain Verjee](#), CNN Int'l, February 18, 2003, discussing the possibility of an ICC trial for UK P.M. Tony Blair if the US and UK go to war against Iraq.



["Bush Is Backing Exile for Hussein."](#) by Sonni Efron, LA Times, January 31, 2003



["US Would Welcome Exile for Saddam: Bush"](#), Agence France Presse, January 30, 2003

["Trying Saddam: The Options,"](#) by Anthony Dworkin, Crimes of War Project, November 18, 2002



["U.S. Would Seek to Try Hussein for War Crimes."](#) by Peter Slevin, Washington Post, October, 29, 2002

["Try Him for His Crimes,"](#) by David Scheffer, Former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Washington Post, September 12, 2002

["Indict Saddam."](#) by Kenneth Roth, Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2002

["US Senate Calls for War Crimes Trial for Saddam Hussein,"](#) CNN interactive, March 13, 1998

#### Background on Crimes

[WICC Q&A Factsheet, "Could the ICC Try Saddam Hussein?"](#)



[Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/15](#), April 19, 2002

For more information about Iraqi war crimes go to the [INDICT](#) website.